Candidate countries of central and eastern Europe (CEECs) are suppose to join the EU in 2004, June, which imply that they will face important challenges in the conduct of macroeconomic policy, in order to be able to enter the ERM-II system and eventually enter the EMU (European Monetary Union).
Introduction
It is often argued that pegging the currency (and eventually adopting the euro) is optimal for two groups of countries: those for whom the benefits from stabilization largely exceed the cost of loosening their monetary policy; and those for whom the convergence process is sufficiently achieved to bring the degree of symmetry of business cycles close enough to a critical level. For countries, which enter the EU (European Union) in June 2004 and have achieved intermediate levels of restructuring, keeping their own currencies within the ERMII is an option as long as the process of increase in productivity gains continues. However the question of joining the EMU as soon as possible, even for these intermediary countries, is worth asking. The huge estimate of EU extra trade in Rose [2000] suggests indeed that fixing the currency does not only entail a significant cut-off in transaction costs, but it also significantly increases the degree of market integration while decreasing that of market imperfections 2 . It is true that loosing independent monetary policy might entail significant costs for countries, which have succeeded in recovering and are in a process of catchingup. But those costs have probably been exaggerated, and their estimation biased by the traditional optimal currency area criteria. The main criticism against a too strong emphasis on the latter rests on two arguments. The first one is that assessing the trade-off for joining the EMU does not deliver the same conclusion ex ante and ex post. Meanwhile, the degree of financial integration will increase dramatically, which in turns will lower the opportunity cost of loosing the monetary policy for absorbing country specific shocks. In a world of increasing financial integration, the room left for an independent monetary policy is very narrow, maybe close to zero in small, emerging countries, more vulnerable to speculative attacks than countries in the core. The second argument is more empirical.
While the link between the exchange rate regime and the fundamentals is rather weak, the political agenda of joining the EU and subsequently the EMU seems to explain the choice of the exchange rate regime.
After reviewing the main arguments, which allow revisiting the traditional Optimal Currency Area criteria, we test in section 2 the Feldstein and Horioka [1980] hypothesis regarding the perfect capital mobility across European countries and across East European countries. We conclude that there is substantial room for increase in financial integration, which is likely to influence the ex post cost of loosing the monetary instrument. In section 3 we emphasize the quite substantial variation in exchange rate regimes, and we correlate in section 4 those observed exchange rate regimes across CEECs over the nineties, and the indicator of financial integration proposed by Feldstein and Horioka [1980] 3 .
While there is a priori no clear relationship between the status of capital liberalization and the choice of monetary and exchange rate regime, the result illustrate that the CEECs have been prone to adopt fix exchange rate regimes in a context of increasing capital mobility. This is interpreted in a framework where the choice of entering a Custom Union is a mostly exogeneous and political decision, as in Flandreau and Maurel [2001] , and where this choice depends crucially upon the specific conditions faced in Central and Eastern Europe, namely the EU enlargement.
Section 1: revisiting the traditional OCA criteria Assessing the cost of unilateral euroization can be done in the framework of the Mundell's wellknown theory. Besides the fact that loosing the instrument of monetary policy can be costly in the presence of asymmetric shocks, when labour mobility is low and prices are rigid, the cost encompasses the loss of seigniorage and loss of Lender of Last Resort. While the former is usually fairly low, of the probable order of 1-2 percent of GDP according to Schobert [2001] in countries, which stabilised, in principle the function of Lender of Last Resort can be partially fulfilled by the Central Bank of the new common currency. In addition, according to Feige [2003] , the level of dollarisation and euroisation in CEECs is fairly high 4 . The percent of total currency held as foreign currency ranges from 6% in Hungary to 35% and 41% in respectively Croatia 5 and Bulgaria. This implies a much weaker efficiency of domestic monetary policy and fiscal policy, foreign cash transactions corresponding to a switch toward the underground economy.
In the case of an enlarged Europe including Eastern countries, labor mobility is as low as within EU core countries, prices are supposed to be rigid, and fiscal transfers limited in the framework of the Maastricht Treaty. Last but not least, the degree of symmetry of shocks, which is already low enough among EU member countries, is even lower between East-West countries 6 . However, these findings are based on mainly empirical evidence and there are at odd with the argument that specialization should increase the probability of asymmetric shocks. It might be that the focus on the supply side has been overemphasized. Flandreau and Maurel [2001] analyze the impact of monetary arrangements on trade integration and business cycle correlation in a more comprehensive framework. Focusing on late 19th century Europe, they formalize the demand forces induced by coordination of public policies alongside the specialization forces 7
. By this means, they are able to isolate the negative impact of trade integration on business cycles via the specialization channel, but this negative impact is overcompensated by the positive impact of public policy co-ordination. And as a result, the net effect of a CU on trade integration is positive. Then business cycles are used as a proxy for the external constraint. The basic assumption is that when business cycles are at odd, and when the financial market is reluctant to finance unbalances because of capital imperfections, the external constraint is binding and has a negative impact on trade. Conversely symmetry allows imports to be financed through exports in a smoother way. In a framework of two simultaneous equations, the authors calculate the extra trade generated by memberships into the Autro-Hungarian monetary Union, which is somehow intriguingly three times the average trade as in the controversial Roses's paper [2000] . This extra trade is part of the benefit from entering a Currency Union. impact of exchange rate uncertainty on the distribution of capital across industries and across countries. While within the boundaries of a country one is entitled to assume that "highly paid analysts estimate the future risk and return of industry X against the general market, and winning firms against the others, which increase industrial efficiency" (McKinnon, 2002, page 358) , the impossibility of predicting exchange rates, which behave like random walks, induce the same experts to recommend, for any one industry, lesser holdings denominated in foreign currency than in the domestic currency.
Section 2: estimating the potential for international risk sharing and further financial integration
The previous section concludes by inverting the traditional Mundel's criteria in stating that more symmetric countries benefit more from a common currency zone. It illustrates that sharing the risk of asymmetric shocks by joining a monetary union delivers higher payoffs for countries, which being specialized face a higher degree of shocks asymmetry, or for countries, which become more specialized as the very result of the monetary union. The purpose of this section is to estimate the potential for international risk sharing facing the CEECs, presumably specialized with respect to EU core member countries.
Our strategy is to measure the level of international capital flows, which indeed reflects the domestic bias analyzed by McKinnon (2002) , that is the extent to which domestic saving tends to remain to be invested in the country. For assessing what it could within the EMU enlarged towards CEECs we apply the methodology proposed in Feldstein and Horioka [1980] to a sub-sample of EU actual member countries and to a sample of CEECs over the nineties. We estimate therefore equations of the form: Greece. The corresponding ratios of gross domestic investment to gross domestic product also show substantial variation. The 13-years average gross investment ratio has a mean of 21%. Saving is higher than capital, which points to a capacity of providing higher returns countries with this available saving. A quite substantial variation characterizes also the patterns of saving and investment across Central and Eastern European countries. Most importantly investments (25%) exceed saving (22%), which illustrate that they are investment opportunities in those high growth and catching-up countries. , implying that the estimated beta is biased upwards. The second explanation lies in the fact that for large countries, the interest rate is not exogeneous, and determines both national savings and investment
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. The third explanation is that real interest parity does not hold, because of the existence of currency factors, namely currency premium.
Of course if there are differences in rates of return across countries, the Feldstein-Horioka condition cannot be observed. By contrast CEECs face a quite substantial degree of rigidities and locational preference, despite the dramatic increase in opening the Eastern capital markets over the last decade. Let compare within estimates before and after the middle of the decade: equal to 0.61 and 0.63 for EU countries and CEECs, they are set equal to a number not significantly different from zero for EU countries but still high and significant for CEECs (0.59), which do not yet benefit from memberships into the wide 14 As suggested in the Flandreau and Riviere's paper [1999] , in which the very low process of financial integration is described as an historical long-term phenomena, which broke up during the two world wars while the nineties are characterized as having promoted its acceleration within old-industrialized countries including European ones. 15 They compute the correlation of saving and investment across national regions, within the United Kingdom.
European financial market. This result suggests that memberships into the EU will bring about significant increase in financial integration and capital mobility. This increase in financial integration makes quite implausible the idea that flexible exchange rates allow independence in monetary and domestic policies; it decreases therefore the ex post opportunity cost of an early adoption of the euro. If that trade openness is often associated with capital mobility, a contrario, in a world of imperfect finance (i.e. low capital mobility), the current account constraint may become an obstacle when the financial system is reluctant to tolerate and finance growing bilateral trade imbalances. Flandreau and Maurel [2001] interpret the degree of symmetry of business cycles as a proxy for the need of financing the imbalances between import and export. They consider capital financial integration to be a substitute for the symmetry of business cycles and to promote trade integration. Results presented here support the view that financial integration allows sharing the risks 17 (from the supply side), and 16 However this considerable degree of capital market integration is considered as puzzling. It is not observed during the period of increasing financial integration. Instead the authors observe a pronounced business cycle effect, implying that beta is positive (negative) during expansionary (recession) phases. 17 As underlined in McKinnon [2002, page 354] , it is more useful when countries are more specialized and more exposed to asymmetric shocks: "Once risk-sharing through portfolio diversification in bond holding is properly weighted, the case for a monetary union becomes eve stronger as the constituent parts of the underlying economic union become more specialized in what they produce. Presumably, the productivity gain from greater regional specialization is one of the major benefits of having an economic cum monetary union in the first place!" compensating for the negative impact the current account constraint has on the intensity of trade integration (from the demand side). , at least at the beginning of transition, but this influence diminishes through time, and finally stabilizes around the fifth or sixth year. "For several
Central and Eastern European countries in the process of accession to the European Union, the dynamics of the real exchange rate can now be assimilated to that of previously acceding countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece, with the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect playing a dominant role at later stages of transition."
Another argument bordering on the above Balassa Samuelson effect is that the probability of asymmetric shocks might be still high, requiring the use of an independent monetary and exchange rate policy. But if, following again Coricelli and Jazbec [2001] , we assume that the influence of asymmetric shocks imputable to restructuring is over, then the question is to know whether the cost of accommodating higher inflation and productivity gains by labour and price flexibility outweighs the benefit of being a member of the EU currency union. The same question was asked for Mediterranean countries when they were candidates. In Babetski et alii [2002] , it is shown that the nineties have been characterized by an increase in the symmetry of demand shocks across EU and Transition countries:
hence the cost of giving up monetary independence could be decreasing. Fidrmuc and Schardax [2000] argue that one explanation behind the increase in the symmetry of shocks lies in the pattern of trade (increasingly intra-industry).
The choice of the exchange rate regime does not seem to have been determined by any particular economic situation: the wide range of exchange rate regimes is not correlated with fundamentals.
Furthermore, CEECs often tried to manage their currency in order to be in compliance with Maastricht 18 Structural reforms are measured by the ratio of the workers employed in manufacture on the number of workers employed in services, and instrumentalised by the structural reform index of De Melo, Denizer and Gelb [1996] and total credit to the private sector (EBRD Transition Report, 1999 Section 4: international capital flows matter for the exchange rate regime choice Feldstein and Horioka [1980] emphasise that the international mobility of the world's supply of capital is crucial for analysing a wide range of issues, including the optimal rate of saving and the incidence of tax changes. One should add to this wide range of issues the room left for monetary policy independence under a fixed exchange rate regime, as emphasised previously, and symmetrically the extent of fiscal policy independence under a flexible exchange rate regime. As we know from the traditional Mundellian analysis, an increase in financial integration lowers the efficiency of fiscal and monetary policies. In other words, in the same way it can change the incidence of tax changes, the international mobility of capital might undermine a policy aiming at absorbing asymmetric shocks (whatever the nature of the exchange rate regime, flexible or fixed). In addition this international mobility of capital is far from occurring in a world where the perfect financial markets postulate holds.
Bubbles, multiple equilibriums, imperfect information, which are a very probable feature of contemporary financial markets, and the increasing capital mobility have raised the consensus 19 See Gomulka [2001] and Coricelli [2002] . 20 The financial gain is emphasized in Flandreau and Maurel [2001] .
amongst economists that removing capital movement restrictions has brought about increased financial instability, and that the greater capital mobility makes very difficult the credibility and sustainability of any exchange rate regime, whatever flexible or fixed In what follows we propose to assess the impact of the mobility of capital on the exchange rate regime choice. The assumption we are going to test is that the increase in financial integration has pushed
CEECs towards the adoption of fixed exchange rate regimes. The opposite could have been observed. . In other words the specificity of the CEECs is that they face and will continue to face a dramatic increase in financial integration (and financial instability) within the European frontiers, which make inefficient both flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes and oblige them to give up the use of the monetary and fiscal policy as a way of absorbing asymmetric shocks 26 .
Given the institutional features of the EU enlargement, which requires the adoption of the monetary part of the Acquis Communautaire (adoption of the euro), the increase in capital mobility and the ongoing neutrality of exchange rate regime should be associated with more fixity.
For testing this assumption we correlate an exchange rate regime variable with the indicator of international financial integration FIN proposed in Feldstein and Horioka [1980] , which is the absolute difference between saving and investment rates in percent of GDP. If incremental saving tends to be invested in the country of origin, differences among countries in investment rates should reflect closely differences in saving rates, and the indicator should be biased towards zero. Conversely the higher the degree of international financial integration, the more the indicator moves away from nil. 
Results in table 7 support the view that the increase in capital mobility has been accompanied by a move towards more fix exchange rate regimes. In Babetski et alii [2002] it is assumed that demand 25 Flandreau and Maurel [2001] emphasise that entering a Currency Union is not a matter of economic rationale, it is essentially a political choice. This assumption allows them to specify the instruments they use in order to properly estimate the impact of memberships into a Currency Union on trade. Here we argue that once countries have choosen to adopt the euro, that is to loose the monetary policy instrument, they are more prone to fix the currency when the financial constraint is more binding. 26 One could imagine that the requirement for being member of the EU would be to implement flexible exchange rate regimes, which would make fiscal policy inoperant, and to use monetary policy strictly for stabilisation purposes. 27 The latter are taken from Babetski et alii [2002] , and the methodology is described in more details in Annex 2. 28 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, The Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
shocks are very much conditioned by the nature of the monetary regime, whereas supply shocks are reflecting the process of transition towards the market. The positive correlation between the convergence of demand shocks and the exchange rate regime variable corresponds to the very product of the alignment of CEECs monetary policy on the EU monetary policy, and therefore to the settingup of fixed exchange rate regimes. More demand symmetric countries tend indeed to fix their currencies.
Supply shocks reflect more fundamental variables, for instance productivity gains occurring only in transition countries. According to discussion in section 3, they are not expected being correlated with the choice of any particular exchange rate regime. We interpret there the negative and significant estimate between the divergence of supply shocks and the exchange rate regime variable as reflecting the fact that more asymmetric countries in the sample, Bulgaria and the three Baltic States, have tended to fix their currencies. Another interpretation relies on the argument raised by Mundell (1973) , according to which more asymmetric countries have better to fix their currency in order to share the risk and diversify their portfolio. 
Conclusion
The greater diversity of exchange rate regimes across CEECs is striking if one considers that those countries have achieved similar restructuring, institutional reforms, and macroeconomic stabilization.
This paper goes further and asks the question of the optimal exchange rate regime during the process of the EU enlargement. It emphasizes that in the European context, which is a context of perfect capital mobility in the sense of Feldstein and Horioka [1980] , the idea that the choice of the exchange rate regime, whatever flexible or fixed, matters for dealing with asymmetric shocks, turns out to be an illusion. On the other hand one important institutional and political feature of the EU enlargement is the subsequent adoption of the EMU. The latter is crucial for understanding why the nineties and the ongoing (as well as expected further) increase in financial integration have been characterized by a significant move towards more fix exchange rate regimes, as shown in section 3.
As in Nuti [2002] and Coricelli [2002] , this paper supports the view that an early adoption of the euro is the optimal strategy for emerging countries, peripheral to the wide European market and highly vulnerable to capital switches. It stresses the point that the ex post opportunity cost of adopting the euro is very low. If the ex post degree of capital mobility can be expected to be that currently observed within European countries indeed, as calculated in section 2, then there will be no room left for conducting any monetary policy insulated from the rest of the Union (the same acknowledgement of inefficiency would apply to more flexible exchange rate regimes and their associated fiscal policy).
The rationale for ERMII is very low if one considers like the author of this paper that the assumption that financial and monetary markets are related to fundamentals, at least in the short run, does not hold. Furthermore one important contribution of this paper is to emphasize that what really drives the choice of the exchange rate regime is the political decision to enter the EU and subsequently to adopt all the Acquis Communautaire. Put in other words the perceived gains are so large tat they outweigh the risk of fixing the exchange rate at an inappropriate level. (% change, annual averages) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Table 4 Volatility of nominal exchange rates 1 (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Table 6 Public debt*** (% GDP) 1990 (% GDP) 1991 (% GDP) 1992 (% GDP) 1993 (% GDP) 1994 (% GDP) 1995 (% GDP) 1996 (% GDP) 1997 (% GDP) 1998 (% GDP) 1999 Following the literature derived from OCA theory that was used to assess the cost of EMU for "euroland countries", we answer this question by assessing the differences in business cycles between the EU and the eastern countries
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. The idea is that the closer the fluctuations of the countries, the more they will benefit from a common policy response. On the other hand, if shocks are asymmetric then giving up a tool of national policy management will be costly. A measure of the similarity of business cycles across countries is the correlation of demand shocks, and its evolution since the transition process began.
Furthermore, with respect to transition countries, the similarity of supply shocks should also be analysed.
The former will reflect temporary shock and hence the shape of the business cycle, while the second will represent the structural side of the economy.
For current EMU countries, the exchange rate was mainly a demand stabilisation tool. For transition countries however, foregoing the exchange rate is foregoing a tool that was used to adjust both demand and supply shocks, as exchange rate policies have often been used to help address the adverse supply shocks of the transition towards a market economy, which rendered entire sectors non competitive. They consisted sometimes of huge devaluations (see Poland) to smooth the restructuring process and the increase in unemployment. In the long run, of course, the currency should return to its equilibrium value, which implies a steady appreciation as progress in restructuring is made, liquidation of uncompetitive sectors at world market clearing prices occurs, and there are productivity gains in the newly emerging private sector. This assumpion echoes the finding in Coricelli and Jazbec [2001] , according to whom the real exchange rate behavior is influenced by structural reforms at the beginning of transition, but this influence diminishes over time, and its dynamics can be assimilated to that of previously acceding countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that demand shocks are very much conditioned by the nature of the monetary regime, whereas supply shocks are reflect the process of transition towards the market, as argued above. Distinguishing demand from supply shocks is therefore very important, since the former are likely to reflect an endogeneous process where the similarity of demand shocks is the very product of the alignment of CEECs monetary policy on the EU monetary policy, while the latter are informative about whether CEECs are still facing asymmetric shocks before entering the monetary union (once the convergence process has resumed). Therefore we take into account the fact that countries that share a common policy are likely to display the same (endogeneous) pattern of demand shocks as in the EU, while supply shocks are more likely to reflect productivity gains occurring only in transition countries, that is, to generate a certain level of asymmetry between EU member countries and CEECs. Babetski J and alii [2002] 's methodology consists of two steps.
1) Following the methodology of Bayoumi and Eichengreen [1996] , demand and supply shocks are estimated with a VAR model for the accession countries, United States and the aggregate EU-15 as alternative benchmarks. Because the sample largely covers the transition period, one expects the correlation coefficients between countries to be rather weak for both types of shocks [Horvath, 2001] .
2) In a second step, following Boone (1997) time-varying estimation (Kalman filter) allows to compute "time-varying correlation coefficients". More formally, the time varying a(t) and b(t) coefficients in equation (1) (1) For a convergence process to be at work, both b(t) and a(t) must tend towards zero, as this will mean that the shock X(CEEC(i)) is entirely explained by the reference (EU) shock. Furthermore, the more b(t) diverges from zero and tends towards one, the more important the rest of the world is (here proxied by the United States) in contributing to the shocks affecting the eastern country. 30 The results show that supply shocks coefficients b(t) increase or remain stable over time as long as the transition process evolves; for demand shocks, b(t) start from a relatively high level, and then decrease over time as the monetary integration deepens. This means that demand shocks in the candidate country and reference country are getting closer and therefore can be addressed by a common monetary policy, while supply shocks have to be addressed through internal adjustments. 
